题目：The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grants and Fiscal Performance around the World

作者：Jonathan Rodden

文献出处：American Journal of Political Science, 2002,Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 670-687.

主讲人：刘丹博士

时间：2019年10月10日14：00-16：00

地点：浙江财经大学我院1号楼302室

主办单位：浙江财经大学现代公共经济学研究中心

内容摘要：This article uses cross-national data to examine the effects of fiscal and political institutions on the fiscal performance of subnationalgovernments. Long-term balanced budgets among subnational governments are found when either (1) the center imposes borrowing restrictions or (2) subnational governments have both wide-ranging taxing and borrowing autonomy. Large and persistent aggregate deficits occur when subnational governments are simultaneously dependent on intergovernmental transfers and free to borrow—a combination found most frequently among constituent units in federations. Time-series cross-section analysis reveals that as countries increase their reliance on intergovernmental transfers over time, subnational and overall fiscal performance decline, especially when subnational governments have easy access to credit. These findings illuminate a key dilemma of fiscal federalism and a more precise notion of its dangers: When constitutionally or politically constrained central governments take on heavy cofinancing obligations, they often cannot credibly commit to ignore the fiscal problems of lower-level governments.

本文利用跨国数据，考察了财政制度和政治制度对地方政府财政绩效的影响。地方政府的长期平衡预算是基于中央政府施加的借贷限制或地方政府拥有的广泛的税收和借贷自主权。当地方政府同时依赖政府间转移支付和自由借贷时，就会出现巨额和持续的总赤字，这种情形最常见于各联邦成员。时间序列横截面分析显示，随着对政府间转移支付依赖程度的增加，地方和总体的财政绩效呈下降趋势，尤其是在地方政府较容易获得信贷的情况下。这些发现揭示了财政联邦主义的一个主要困境以及对其危害的一个更精准的概括：当受到宪法或政治约束的中央政府承担大量的共同融资义务时，它们往往无法可信地承诺对地方政府的财政问题置之不理。