题目：Size and dynastic decline: The principal-agent problem in late imperial China,1700-1850

作者：XuTuan-HweeSng

报告人:鲍旦颖 倪霓

科研助理：汪志杰

时间：2017年4月6日13:30—15:00

地点：浙江财经大学我院1号楼302室

主办单位：bat365官网登录入口

文献信息：Sng T H. Size and dynastic decline:The principal-agent problem in late imperial China, 1700–1850[J]. Explorations in Economic History, 2014, 54(C):107–127.

内容摘要：This paper argues that China's size was one reason behind its relative decline in the nineteenth century. A ruler governing a large country faces severe agency problems. Given his monitoring difficulties, his agents have strong incentives to extort the taxpayers.This forces him to keep taxes low to prevent revolts. Economic expansion could aggravate corruption and cause further fiscal weakening. To support the model's predictions, I show that the Chinese state taxed and administered sparingly, especially in regions far from Beijing. Furthermore, its fiscal capacity contracted steadily during the prosperous eighteenth century, sowing the seeds for the nineteenth-century crises.

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